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INTRODUCTION 
1. The following observations are based on the general approach of the 
Martin, Colombo and Giscard d'Estaing reports on the Community Institutions: 
emphasis on the federal nature of the Community; growing financial autonomy at 
Community level; real Community revenue to finance Community expenditure; full 
legislative powers for Parliament, including the budgetary field (both revenue 
and expenditure); gradual development of the Commission into a politically 
responsible executive and the Council into a 'Chamber of States'. 
2. However, uncertainty over the outcome of the current revision of the 
Treaties makes it necessary to distinguish between: 
procedural adjustments possible within the current framework of the 
Treaties, which could be implemented before 1993, and 
necessary reforms at Treaty level. 
I. POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS WITHOUT CHANGING THE TREATIES 
3. These should be based on two concerns: 
to improve the form and content of conciliation between the two arms of the 
budget authority; 
to give the Community budget back its full political significance, beyond 
its technical dimension. 
4. Despite the considerable progress brought about by the pragmatic 
timetable, conciliation between Parliament and the Council still lacks 
substance, particularly before the Council's first reading of the budget. 
This partly because, despite the interinstitutional agreement of 1988, the 
Council still insists on religiously respecting Article 203 of the Treaty, 
even if the reading thereby loses its political significance. 
5. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that the Council is not 
given enough time to examine the Commission's preliminary draft budget. The 
situation would be improved if the Council could be guaranteed an extra month. 
6. At the same time, the first conciliation meeting between Parliament and 
Council could be brought forward to the beginning of July, i.e. two weeks 
before the Council's first reading. 
7. This would then result in the following timetable: 
February: fixing of Parliament's budget requirements 
April: adoption of preliminary draft budget by the Commission 
early July: first Parliament-Council conciliation 
late July: adoption of draft budget by Council. 
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8. If the conciliation procedure took place at the beginning of July, the 
meeting at the Council at the end of July would no longer be necessary. 
Instead, to ensure good contacts between the institutions, the Council could 
invite the rapporteurs of the Committee on Budgets to attend its first and 
second readings of the budget. 
9. This innovation would also have the advantage of correcting an unwarranted 
imbalance. At the moment, Parliament is the only one of the three 
institutions to debate the budget in the presence of representatives of the 
other two institutions, at every stage of its deliberation, both in the 
Committee on Budgets and in plenary. This open practice should be reciprocal. 
The presence of Parliament representatives, at least at some of its meetings, 
would provide the Council with more information. 
10. Other innovations would be 1 ike 1 y to increase the po 1 it i ca 1 impact of 
the vote on the European budget. 
11. A proper public debate on revenue is needed. At the moment, this does not 
happen either before Parliament or even before the Counci 1. The result is 
outrageous: 55 billion ECU is taken from the Community taxpayer as a result of 
decisions behind closed doors! 
Without waiting for revision of the Treaties, Parliament should debate and 
vote on revenue, or at least at first reading. 
12. In the same vein, Parliament would have more incentive to give the budget 
its full po 1 it i ca 1 importance if the second reading ended with a vote on the 
budget as a whole. 
13. It will be seen that the existence of 'compulsory expenditure' is not so 
offensive if Parliament has the final say on the overall amount of the budget 
- and expresses it in a final overall vote. 
14. For its part, the Council would benefit from stating its position at 
second reading at a General Affairs Council or in a joint General Affairs -
Budget meeting. In fact, while the debate is limited to the Budget Ministers 
and their immediate colleagues, the Council cannot act as a real political 
counterweight to Parliament: the Council sees its role as that of financial 
safety barrier, which is not the same. 
II. FURTHER REFORMS 
15. There are two possible approaches to revision of the Treaties. 
16. The fist procedure would be based on the current system: a first reading 
by the Council, followed by a first reading by Parliament in which amendments 
could be introduced by a simple majority, followed by a second reading by the 
Council in which Parliament's amendments could be rejected by a qualified 
majority; and final adoption of the budget by Parliament by a qualified 
majority. 
17. This procedure, which has the advantage of being tried and tested, would 
appreciably strengthen Parliament's role, but it would be less suitable for 
the new budget situation, in which there would no longer be any distinction 
between types of expenditure. 
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18. An alternative solution would be to establish a new institutional 
balance, with Parliament having the same prerogatives as the Council. 
19. The Commission would submit the preliminary draft budget to the budget 
authority. The two arms of the budget authority would give their positions 
on the preliminary draft budget as a whole at the same time at first reading. 
20. The two texts would then be submitted to a 'conciliation committee' 
composed of representatives of Parliament and Council. Within a given period, 
the committee would submit a compromise draft to the budget authority. The 
budget would then be adopted if the two arms of the budget authority adopted 
this compromise draft by a simple majority. 
21. If the conciliation committee's compromise draft were rejected by a 
qua 1 i fi ed majority by one of the two arms, the text would be returned to the 
conciliation committee or another round. 
22. Parliament would have the fi na 1 say in so far as it would be the Lower 
Chamber of a federal system. 
This poses two questions. 
23. (a) qualified majority or simple majority? If the budget is to represent 
a real political choice, the principle of the simple majority, 
universally practised in this area, must be adopted; 
(b) Parliament should have the 'overall' final say in the final vote on 
the budget as a whole. Should it also have the final say on each of 
the chapters? Obviously the answer is yes, in a truly federal 
system, which is what we favour. 
It is possible that, at least initially, the future Community institutions 
might in fact give greater importance to the role of the Chamber of States 
(the present Council) in this area, while giving the Community responsibility 
for foreign policy. 
In this case, if the same distribution of tasks were transferred to the 
budgetary procedure, then: 
Parliament could have the final say for the overall budget, own resources 
and 'internal' expenditure (connected with the Community's internal 
policies), and 
the Council could have the final say for 'external' expenditure (foreign 
policy and external aid). 
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Working Document 
on 
revision of the financial perspective 
Rapporteur: Mr Calogero LO GIUDICE 
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Introduction 
1. The sub-report which I have been appointed to draw up for the Working 
Party on Future Financing must not only deal with revision of the financial 
perspective in the strict sense, but must also cover revision of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement proper and its replacement with a better system, 
and hence extend to expenditure policy as a whole. 
Only by adopting this broader perspective can the sub-report follow the two-
stage process 1 aid down by the coordinator of the working party, 
Mr COLOM I NAVAL. 
The first stage will conclude with an interim report to be tabled at 
Parliament's October part-session: it follows that this first document must 
begin the process by identifying the basic elements of the financial reform of 
the Community, which, relating as they do to the budgetary provisions of the 
Treaty, wi 11 have an impact on the nature of the agreements between the 
institutions responsible for the budget and hence on the multiannual 
forecasts. 
Parliament's work might thus be used to good effect as the basis for the 
proposals to be discussed at the Intergovernmental Conferences on Economic and 
Monetary Union and on Political Union. 
The next step after the Intergovernmental Conferences will be to translate the 
new system of prov1s1ons into new forms of understanding, acts, and 
regulations. That will be the time when the Community will be able to lay 
down the new body of rules to govern revenue and expenditure under a 
budgetary policy based on a philosophy and model that mark a radical departure 
from the status quo. 
2. On the strength of these considerations, your rapporteur believes that, 
as far as revision of the financial perspective is concerned, the interim 
report must set out the genera 1 pri nc i p 1 es to form the necessary reference 
basis. By contrast, the second stage, and the report which I shall have the 
honour to submit, will afford a prime opportunity for working out the 
practical and substantive framework within which to begin negotiating the new 
Interinstitutional Agreement in 1993. 
It seems essential that budgetary policy should, to an increasing extent, 
become the key instrument for defining Community activity, without running 
counter to acts of major political significance. 
3. Indeed, to become fully operative, the Single Act, which, notwithstanding 
its limitations, has created new problems and established powers not provided 
for in the Community Treaties, and the decisions of the Heads of State or 
Government would have required a budgetary policy capable of giving effect to 
their substance. (It need only be recalled that the Single Act has 
introduced new Community policies on the environment, research, transport, 
drugs, etc.). 
In the light of the foregoing, and of the experience of recent years, the 
Interinstitutional Agreement has proved grossly inadequate. 
OOC_EN\RR\98958 
- 8 - PE 144.172/fin./C 
In the paragraphs below, the rapporteur will analyse the main 
Agreement and the ways in which they have hitherto been given 
being to identify more clearly the direction which the 
provisions should take. 
(a) Negative aspects of the agreement 
features of the 
effect, the aim 
new budgetary 
4. In the opinion of your rapporteur, the Interinstitutional Agreement -
though not without its positive features - has failed to attain the important 
objective of restoring an even balance of power between the two arms of the 
budget authority. 
During the life of the Agreement, at least as far as it has been possible to 
judge to date, the Council has not taken account of changing circumstances in 
the interpretation it has given to Article 203 of the Treaty and hence to the 
relationship with Parliament, which is often considered a purely nominal part 
of the budget authority. 
Two recent examples might be cited as evidence of this attitude: 
The Council's inflexible response to Parliament's proposal for the financial 
perspective to be revised to take account of the new and unforeseen events 
which confronted the Community in 1989, in other words the development of the 
situation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Parliament's powers and the balance underlying the Interinstitutional 
Agreement have been further adversely affected by the Counci 1' s failure to 
comply properly with paragraphs 9 and 12 of the Agreement, the potentially 
innovative part providing for a kind of dynamic. 
Another and still more recent ex amp 1 e of the Council 's wrong-headed po 1 icy 
relates to the position it took at the second reading of the 1990 
supplementary and amending budget No. 2, when, without any legally or 
po 1 it i ca 11 y va 1 i d arguments, it rna i nta i ned that the budget authority, i . e. 
Parliament, could not amend the revenue side of the Community budget, denying 
Parliament powers which it claimed solely for itself. 
(b) Positive aspects 
5. The Interinstitutional Agreement has nevertheless marked a positive stage 
in the development of Community financial law. 
The resolution of 15 June 1988 ratifying the Interinstitutional Agreement 
(OJ No. C 187, 18.7.1988) referred to its 'importance for harmonious 
cooperation ... with a view to implementing the Single Act'. The Agreement 
deserves credit to the extent that it has created a climate of greater 
transparency and trust in the relations between the two arms of the budget 
authority, moving away from the old strife and tensions. 
In addition, the Agreement has made it possible to finance policies aimed at 
completion of the single market and at bringing about economic and social 
cohesion (Single Act) and, through the financial perspective, has introduced a 
system of multiannual expenditure planning such as to enable the Community to 
develop along ordered lines. 
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6. The foregoing remarks imply the conclusion that the Intergovernmental 
Conferences must define a new philosophy on expenditure policy, expressed not 
only in the form of operating rules, but also in the objectives to be pursued 
by the Community, both internally and externally. Thoroughgoing revision of 
the categories used in the financial perspective, as well as of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement, will accordingly be required, and a new system 
will have to be laid down to govern expenditure policy. 
A new expenditure policy for the Community 
7. In anticipation of the Intergovernmental Conferences, our working party 
must spell out the pri nci pl es to govern Community expenditure in the years 
ahead. 
(a) The premisses 
I shall confine myself here to 
expenditure system must be based; 
listing the premisses 
in particular: 
on which the new 
po 1 it i ca 1 and fi nanc i a 1 autonomy of the Community, i . e. Community revenue 
must be determined by the budget authority both within a multiannual 
reference framework and under the annual procedure; 
restoration of an even balance of power within the budget authority between 
the Council and Parliament in all acts connected with the budget; 
removal of the now completely obsolete distinction between compulsory and 
non-compulsory expenditure; 
inc 1 us ion in the budget of all Community fi nanc i a 1 
European Deve 1 opment Fund, borrowing and 1 ending 
accordance with the principle of budget unity. 
(b) The principles 
operations -
operations 
ECSC, 
in 
8. Expenditure policy must be informed by principles enshrined either in the 
Treaties or in interinstitutional agreements. 
It will be essential in this connection to stress the redistributive function 
of the budget, which must be given effect in a more coherent way. It is not 
idle to point out that this function is especially important since it now 
relates to structural and aid policies extending to an ever-growing number of 
beneficiaries in a Community already numbering twelve Member States and 
320 million people. 
However, in order to stress the redistributive function of the budget, 
expenditure has to be classified more rationally, in such a way as to identify 
the priority objectives of financial operations, and, above all, more 
substantial resources must be released so as to enable the budget to attain 
the dimensions required to make it an effective instrument of redistribution. 
An appropriate revenue policy will therefore be a sine qua non for an 
expenditure policy enabling the Community to fulfil its role. 
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9. The essential and necessary first step towards a new expenditure policy 
is to define Community policies. 
The Interinstitutional Agreement as it stands merely lists the areas and 
sectors of activity, dividing them, moreover, into categories which are not 
homogeneous, without providing a coherent basis for the specific measures and 
the corresponding funding. The financial operations are consequently, in some 
cases, ineffective, and scattered and fragmentary to an extreme degree. 
Experience teaches us that this verdict also applies to the existing 
structural policies, whose rules must accordingly be revised from top to 
bottom. 
This need is all the greater in the case of the expenditure now covered in the 
fourth category listed in the Interinstitutional Agreement. 
The Council must therefore rectify its current approach, based on the presumed 
existence of 'privileged' policies - since these accord with the traditional 
interests of the Member States and 'non-privileged' policies, whose 
appropriations are often meagre and insufficient to enable the Community 
successfully to achieve the aims which the policies were supposed to achieve. 
10. The initial distinction, then, in terms of sectors of activity must be 
made between Community policies in relation to third countries and the 
policies required to resolve internal problems. 
11. To that end, it will inevitably be necessary to abide by the subsidiarity 
principle and the requirements of multiannual planning, as is essential in 
order to classify and rationalize expenditure. 
Subsidiarity must thus find expression in budgetary policy. In addition to 
setting the objectives, the new Treaty or secondary legislation to be drawn up 
by the Community in agreement with the Member States must provide for a 
demarcation of powers and responsibilities between the federal and state 
levels, specifying the basis (exclusive or complementary) of those powers and 
responsibilities. 
It must be made clear from the outset that this will be a particularly complex 
exercise, since concepts which have hitherto lent themselves more readily to a 
theoretical approach will have to be translated into policy and budgetary 
terms. Exploration of the practical application of the principle will no 
doubt ultimately imply a need to review the present operational system and to 
draw a clear distinction as regards Community, national, regional, and local 
measures. 
At federal level it will be necessary to finance first and foremost the 
measures taken under common policies. 
A more judicious distinction in terms of tiers of operations should logically 
enable the Member States to make a number of savings, and application of the 
subsidiarity principle should help to bring about closer coordination and 
greater rationalization of expenditure. 
12. Having laid down the policies and the nature of Community measures, it 
will then be necessary to place expenditure within a framework of multiannual 
planning. 
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Planning under the current Institutional Agreement has distinguished itself to 
date more as an obstructive than as a dynamic force. It has a 1 so served to 
restrict Parliament's margin for manoeuvre both in determining longer-term 
expenditure and in setting the annual volume of expenditure. 
Planning, however, must come to be viewed both as an instrument for 
consolidating measures which cannot by nature be confined within the annual 
framework and as the means whereby the institutions may make medium-term 
projections as regards the use of resources to attain the underlying 
objectives of Community policies. 
It must also be perceived as an opportunity for the institutions to work 
together and cooperate, and be worked out by the two arms of the budget 
authority - the Council and Parliament - on a footing of equa 1 powers and 
responsibilities, with no preference being given a priori to the role of the 
Council or Parliament. 
Conclusions 
In order to bring about a radical change both to the current 
Interinstitutional Agreement (which has now been made obsolete as a result of 
the restrictive ways in which it has been interpreted and will be superseded 
in the near future by a fundament a 1 reform of the fi nanc ia 1 and budgetary 
provisions of the Treaty) and in the understanding of multiannual expenditure 
planning, the first step for Parliament to take, not least for the benefit of 
the Intergovernmental Conferences, must be to spell out the principles to form 
the basis of the Treaty provisions and regulations governing Community revenue 
and expenditure policy. 
To that end, it is essential from the outset for all the rapporteurs to assert 
the need to amend Article 203 of the Treaty, primarily with a view to 
restoring a genuine balance of powers between the Council and Parliament in 
the matter of Community expenditure. 
It is also proposed that the rapporteur take account of the foregoing remarks 
by incorporating the following paragraphs in the motion for a resolution he is 
to draw up on behalf of Parliament: 
The European Parliament, 
Points out that, for the purposes of the Intergovernmental Conferences and, 
above all, Economic and Monetary Union, it is necessary to adopt a broad 
perspective, in keeping with the Community's new role, and, on that basis, 
to lay down a system of budgetary provisions to make the budget a genuine 
financial instrument for implementing Community policies; 
Is convinced that these imperatives will make it essential to improve upon 
the existing financial cooperation instruments by means of a new 
Interinstitutional Agreement; 
Points, in anti ci pat ion of the expiry of the current fi nanci a 1 rules, to 
the indispensable need to secure a form of financial autonomy such as to 
enable the Community budget to perform redistributive functions 
commensurate with the tasks and role which the Community is called upon to 
accomplish; 
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Considers it essential, therefore, that financially significant Community 
policies should be laid down by the Council and Parliament, within the 
scope of Economic and Monetary Union, in accordance with responsibilities 
and procedures that reflect a new and better balance of powers between the 
budget authorities; 
Is convinced that application of the subsidiarity principle is a sine qua 
non for laying down policy measures proper, and an essential condition for 
more efficient calculation and rationalization of the expenditure entered 
in the Community budget; 
Stresses also that the aim of a new agreement between the institutions -
with a view to attaining the objectives set out in the preceding paragraphs 
- must be to overcome the existing constraints and rigidity, as seen for 
instance in the division into expenditure categories; 
Points out similarly that the new Agreement must be able to cope with the 
imperatives arising from new needs and the new prospects going hand in hand 
with c 1 oser Community integration or the Community's expanding extern a 1 
relations; 
Believes that a rational budgetary policy and hence any new agreement imply 
acceptance of the principles of multiannual expenditure planning, since 
this is a method of regulation and provides indispensable back-up for 
measures requiring contributions spread over several financial years; 
considers such planning also to be required both in the interests of 
rationalization of expenditure and to ensure that operations are fully 
comprehensive in scope; believes that it will serve to underline the 
dynamic nature of expenditure policy, not least in response to the changed 
situations within and outside the Community. 
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Working Document 
on 
own resources 
Rapporteur: Mrs Pasqualina NAPOLETANO 
3 July 1990 
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Future financing and Community own resources 
1. Introduction 
With a view to the Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for December 1990, 
it is appropriate to set out for the Working Party on Future Financing some 
initial views on ways and means of financing the budget. 
1. In our view, discussion as to the projected overhaul of the Community's 
system of financing from 1993 onwards must be based on three 
considerations: 
A. The prospect, ultimately, of securing political union or of 
reallocating national and Community responsibilities, based on the 
principle of subsidiarity, and hence of striking a fresh balance of 
power to the European Parliament's advantage; 
B. As for internal aspects, we must look at the implications of opting 
to establish a single internal market, in the context of economic and 
social cohesion, and to achieve economic and monetary union in the 
short term (with all that this implies for as regards the new 
environment in which national budgets will have to operate); 
C. As for international aspects, we must look at the new political 
responsibilities deriving from the pressing need to take appropriate 
accompanying measures both to support the radical changes that have 
been set in train by recent events in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and in the USSR and to foster a coherent and effective 
development policy vis-a-vis the Southern Hemisphere nations. 
This, then, 1s what the backdrop must be for the debate on future 
Community revenue - a debate that must be our response to the radical 
changes now taking p 1 ace - s i nee the po 1 it i ca 1 , economic and soc i a 1 
objectives proposed must be reflected in the budget. 
With regard to the impact of Community financing on the content of 
economic and soc i a 1 po 1 i ci es, every study on the estab 1 i shment of the 
internal market and of economic and monetary union1 has stressed that the 
redistributive and counterbalancing role of the Community budget must be 
a major consideration. 
What the hi story of monetary unions has shown is that the process of 
surrendering power to a 1 ter exchange rates has been accompanied by the 
establishment of budgetary arrangements designed to ensure cohesion 
between regions or countries. 
With regard to the Community's international involvement, increased 
transfers of resources are to be expected, given both the pressing need 
to find solutions to the problems of Southern Hemisphere indebtedness and 
1 The Neumark report (1962), the Werner report (1970), the McDougall report 
(1977) and the Padoa Schioppa report (1987), to mention but the best-known 
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underdevelopment and the political commitment that has been entered into 
to associate the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the 
Community via a series of agreements, which are likely to contain 
financial protocols, and to support economic reforms in the USSR. 
At this stage, such an approach does not imp 1 y an increase in overa 11 
public spending in the Community or in taxation levels; rather, we shall 
have to decide what responsibilities could, or should, be transferred 
from national level to the Community. We must nevertheless accept the 
principle that the establishment of monetary and political union must be 
accompanied by financial integration or by a financial pol icy approach 
that has been made more effective as a result of reorganizing public 
finances and improving coordination between the various levels of 
government (supranational, national and local). This revamping process 
must be considered an essential aspect of the conferences that are 
planned. 
At all events, the future debate on Community own resources should take 
account of the following principles, which Parliament has asserted time 
and time again1 : 
(A) Individuals' tax burden should not increase; 
(B) The new system will have to take greater account of the relative 
prosperity of the Community Member States and relative per capita 
prosperity; 
(C) A new financial pol icy need not necessarily result in an increased 
COI'IIIIIUf\ 1ty budget by comparison with nation a 1 budgets; rather, the 
Community budget must be used to complement national or regional 
measures to a greater extent. The whole range of measures available 
must be conducive \~ realiziftO the Co.-unity's objectives; 
(0) The budget must be financed on the basis of actual economic 
performance of economic operators in the Community without distorting 
the productive •~9t"Oflll, i.e. w.1thout t.d<l1tional t~x burdens. 
: -' ' '4•-e ' ('( , 1 ~~,:..:~';,'/', r ~h:" ' ~ ,' ',: ' __ ,,.~ 
2. The current system: how it operates and Where the benefits and drawbacks 
are to be found 
2.1. MtMt the sy~tettl opeft\l.t 
Pursuant to the Counci 1 Decision of 24 June 1988 on the system of the 
Community's own resources (88/376/EEC), the budget is financed from: 
(1) agricultu~al levie$; 
(2) customs duties levied at the Community's external frontiers; 
(3} a percentage of the Member States' VAT receipts; 
(4) an additional resource introduced to bridge the gap between the first 
three resources and the Community's financing requirements up to a 
ceiling corresponding to 1.2% of Community GNP (1992); 
1 The Neumark report (1962), the Werner report (1970), the McDougall report 
(1977) and the Padoa Schioppa report (1987), to mention but the best-known 
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(5) other revenue which does not represent own resources, mainly specific 
revenue deriving from the Community's own activities - the most 
important items being the taxes, contributions and levies deducted 
from staff salaries - and national contributions provided for in 
Article 200 of the Treaty in order to balance the budget in the event 
of a deficit. 
In respect of the first two resources the Member States retain, by way of 
collection costs, 10% of the amounts paid. For agricultural levies, this 
is very much dependent on the doll ar/ECU exchange rate, for customs 
duties, on developments in international trade and in GATT trade 
negotiations. The fact is that, as far as financing the budget is 
concerned, these resources are becoming less important. 
The VAT resource is derived by applying a uniform 1.4% rate to the VAT 
assessment base, which is determined on the basis of Community rules and 
may not exceed 55% of a Member State's GNP. The sums calculated for the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany are corrected. 
The cost of compensation for the United Kingdom is shared by the other 
Member States, their shares being calculated by reference to each 
Member State's share in payments in respect of the GNP-based resource, 
with the sole exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, which, since 
1981, has taken advantage of its position as a net contributor to the 
Community budget to reduce its share in financing the UK refund by 
one-third. 
The GNP-based resource is an additional resource designed to ensure a 
ba 1 anced budget; it can a 1 so guarantee a reasonab 1 e increase in the 
budget in the medium term below the overall ceiling of 1.2% of GNP for 
the total amount of own resources. This resource furthermore represents 
an initial effort to make the Community tax system more progressive by 
relating the contributions of each Member State to its actual level of 
relative prosperity. 
2.2. Benefits and drawbacks 
It is undeniable that, compared with past 
represents significant progress. Indeed, 
automatically guarantees that the Community's 
and that the 1 evel of revenue required will 
budget spending. 
record, the 1988 reform 
the compromise reached 
resources will be stable 
reflect the increase in 
In addition, the Interinstitutional Agreement of 24 June 1988 laid down a 
scheme of financial forecasts for the Community for the period 
1988 - 1992 and hence constitutes a further source of stability for 
budget resources. 
There are a number of drawbacks, however, as a result of the way in which 
the system operates. In the current context of Community integration, 
the 10% repayment to the Member States is becoming more and more 
unacceptable. 
The compensation for the United kingdom and the special position of the 
Federal Republic of Germany with regard to its share in financing this 
compensation are more and more unacceptable in an integrated Community 
DOC_EN\RR\98958 
- 17 - PE 144.172/fin./c 
capable of promoting a huge range of policies to be implemented over an 
area that will be enlarged as a result of the recent decision on German 
reunification. 
VAT collection is an area that is not untouched by difficulties either. 
No agreement has been reached on the collection arrangements, while VAT 
receipts only partially reflect Member state prosperity as calculated by 
reference to GNP. Lastly, and this is possibly the most significant 
constraint, VAT revenue is regressive as the level of prosperity 
increases. 
3. Overhauling the own-resources system: a starting point for the debate 
It is well known that the 1988 Decision requires the Commission to 
submit, by the end of 1991, a report on the operation of the current 
system. It also makes express provision for the position of the 
United Kingdom, and hence that of Germany, to be reviewed. Furthermore, 
under Article 2(2) of that Decision, provision is made for the 
introduction of new own resources deriving from any new charges 
i nt reduced under a common po 1 icy in accordance with the procedure 1 aid 
down in Articles 201 and 173 of the EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty 
respectively. 
In this connection, though we propose to consider the merits of creating 
new resources elsewhere in this paper, 1t should be stressed, looking 
ahead to the intergovernmental conferences to come, that, as far as the 
European Parliament is concerned, an essential feature of the process of 
overhauling the financial system will be to amend Article 201 of the 
Treaty, so that there is explicit acknowledgement that the European 
Parliament is vested with power of co-dec is 1 on as regards revenue, as 
well as to bring Article 200 of the EEC Treaty up to date. 
Whatever the circumstances, account should IJfi taken of the follo~ing 
principles in the revision process: 
1. The Community budget must be considered a fully-fledged po 1 it i ca 1 
docUMent; Measures for •h1eh fuftdiftg 1t ••~arked must not, in order 
to be implemented, require a further legal basis. 
2. The budgetary authority a 1 one must be empowered to determine the 
volume and nature of the Community's revenue in a manner consistent 
with the division of responsibilities between the Member States and 
the Community. 
3. The 'dynamic' aspect of the process of European integration, as 
demonstrated by the fact that new Community-level powers are being 
discussed, must be reflected in a 'dynamic' budget under which 
policy measures forming part of the supranational sphere of 
competences can be implemented effectively, involving a scaling down 
of the nation a 1-budget ro 1 e in certain sectors and a corresponding 
increase in the role of the Community budget as regards those 
sectors. Accordingly, the principle of controlling increases in 
overall public spending would be complied with. 
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4. Efforts to promote the development of a genuine own-resources system 
to replace Member States' contributions can be reflected in a 
practical manner by establishing a direct link between the Community 
and the taxpayer. Po 1 icy measures benefiting the taxpayer would 
create the climate of trust that would be needed for the Community 
to be vested with powers of taxation. 
5. The budgetary authority must engage in multiannual revenue and 
expenditure planning. 
6. The Community budget must reflect the re 1 at i ve prosperity of those 
who pay over the contributions (whether this be the Member States or 
the individual taxpayer). To achieve this, a variety of mechanisms 
could be proposed in respect of both GNP and per capita income. 
Given the environment in which the Community budget is currently 
operating, with the CAP continuing to account for more than 50% of 
appropriations, it is perfectly clear that there is insufficient 
financial autonomy to enable new policies to be developed (save to an 
extremely limited degree). This holds true in spite of the increase in 
external-relations appropriations, which is due in large part to the new 
relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. 
What has to be done, then, is to determine the appropriate rate at which 
new own resources should increase so that new policies laid down on the 
basis of the principle of subsidiarity can be financed from the budget. 
Should this increase be proportionate to the rate at which Community GNP 
rises or should it reflect the principles of economic rationale embodied 
in the theory of financial federalism? 
The question is whether provision ought to be made at Community level for 
a budgetary mechanism capable of acting as an economic stabilizer. 
Assuming, as we do at present, that economic and monetary union will 
involve centralized Community policy making, with strict limits on 
government deficits, and that national governments' budgetary policies 
may be geared to differing objectives, it could prove essential to 
bolster Community public-spending powers, provided that this enhanced the 
democratic legitimacy of the Institutions. 
Were the current momentum behind the process of transferring powers to be 
maintained, this would create the conditions referred to as long ago as 
1977 in the McDougall report, which recommended that Community spending 
should be equivalent to 5-7% of Community GOP (with, therefore, a similar 
proportion of resources). This would enable the Institutions to play an 
active role in stabilizing the economy. 
4. Possible new resources for the Community 
As long ago as 1981, Parliament suggested that taxes on the earnings of 
physical persons, company taxes and consumption taxes (VAT) should be 
harmonized at Community level to provide a new basis for the Community's 
own resources. (Spinelli report). 
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Although, in respect of VAT, harmonization efforts have enabled the 
Community to make use of what is now the most important budget resource, 
little progress has been made on approximating, let alone harmonizing, 
arrangements for taxing the earnings of physical persons and of 
companies. 
As we know, however, provision is made in Article 2 of the 1988 
own-resources Decision for new resources to be created on the basis of 
charges introduced under a common policy. 
The progress made since 1988 towards establishing the internal market and 
the process of securing economic and monetary union, as well as political 
union, reflect a gradual move towards a unique type of federal 
association, and it is logical that such a development should be 
reflected in the Community's system of financing. The underlying 
principles for the introduction of a new resource should be as follows: 
1. The taxpayer must be directly aware of the 1 ink between the 
individual and the Community, enabling him or her to evaluate his or 
her own contribution in terms of both cost and benefits; 
2. Compliance with the principle of fiscal fairness; 
3. A new budget resource must be progressive; 
4. A Community tax must be clearly separate from and be in addition to 
national taxes. 
In addition to considering possible new resources, it would be 
interesting, as part of the debate on Community revenue, to take a look 
at the notion of a VAT corrective mechanism put forward in the 1977 
McDougall report. So that the Member States would share the financial 
burden on a more equitable basis, the proposal was, essentially, to 
correct VAT contributions by applying a formula which took account of the 
relative prosperity of the Community population, i.e. a coefficient in 
excess of one would be applied to contributions from Member States with a 
per capita income higher than the Community average, while contributions 
from Member States with a per capita income lower than the Community 
average would be calculated by applying a coefficient of less than one. 
There are some similarities between this mechanism and that applied in 
Germany to distribute VAT yield among the more and less prosperous 
Lander. 
In view of the mobility of assets and inputs, and the concept of external 
effects, economic federalism theory would indicate that two types of tax 
could be transferred to Community level: 
- company profits tax and 
- personal income tax. 
These two instances will be considered below, though it must be stressed 
that, whatever system is adopted, the link between power of taxation for 
the Community and the development of policies benefiting the taxpayer 
must be an essential feature. 
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4.1. Company tax 
There is an obvious link between company profits and the Community's 
internal-market pol icy areas. A proportion of the yield from taxes on 
the profits of Member State companies, then, could conceivably be paid 
over direct to the Community. Apart from overcoming the difficulties 
inherent in harmonizing company taxation, a tax on company profits, as 
proposed inter alia in the 1988 Padoa Schiappa report, would be 
advantageous in that it would be a fitting form of Community-level 
taxation. 
To analyze this theory, a number of assumptions have been made: 
1. As regards a federal structure for economically more advanced states 
(OECD countries), experience indicates that it is normal for 
different forms of company taxation to be in place at more than one 
level of government; 
2. The existence of different forms of company taxation at intermediate 
levels of government (individual states) or at the lowest level 
(local authorities) does not prevent the entire territory of a 
federal state from being a 'single market'; 
3. Differences, then, in company taxation and the fact that this may be 
a process carried out a different 1 eve 1 s of government would not 
prevent the establishment of a union. 
Our basic assumption is that company taxation receipts accrue to the 
highest 'level of government in all federally organized states. Often, 
the process of collecting such taxes is shared at different levels of 
government. 
This is not the main source of income for federal governments. Indeed, 
the yield from company tax levied at the highest level of government is 
equivalent to no more than 0.5 to 3% of GOP. Furthermore, the proportion 
of company tax yield accruing to the highest level of government in 
federal states in the OECD exceeds 64%, varying from close to 30% to 
100%. 
A Community budget to which 64% of company tax yield from the Member 
States accrued would have at its disposal some 65 billion ECU at 1988 
prices, or close to double the level of resources now available to the 
Community. 
It is interesting to note that, if it proved possible to emulate the 
federal states concerned, company tax could be a major source of funding 
for the Community budget, though this would not prevent the Governments 
of the Twelve from keeping part of the tax yield. 
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4.2. A European income tax 
It is common knowledge that the link between the individual citizen and 
the European Community remains fairly fragile, since the impact of 
Community policies is not directly visible to individuals, with the 
possible exception of certain sections of society (farmers). It would 
not be possible, then, to make out a good case for introducing an 
additional tax on earnings unless that tax were accompanied by high-
profile policy measures (e.g. a European Unemployment Fund). 
If a decision were taken to take this possibility further, however, there 
would have to be a redistributive element, which would mean that Member 
States' contributions would have to be calculated by reference to per 
capita GOP and corrected by applying a progressive coefficient. 
Accordingly, the more prosperous countries' contribution to the Community 
budget would lessen as inequalities narrowed. 
5. Other possible new resources 
A debate has been going on for some time at Community level, in the 
Member States and among experts as to the possibility of introducing an 
energy tax; more recently there has also been research on the possible 
tie-in between environmental policy and taxation. 
The rapporteur proposes that an examination should be carried out of such 
research findings and of proposals that have been made on the first issue 
(energy) and that an in-depth investigation should be conducted into 
possible approaches as regards the second issue (the environment and 
taxation), involving exchanges of views with experts. 
However, what is liable to happen with an energy tax? A domestic levy on 
energy products would amount to a tax, while a levy on import would of 
course amount to a customs duty. 
The Commission has already rejected the possibility of a levy on domestic 
production, since this would penalize countries such as Germany and the 
United Kingdom. However, a levy on imports on some or all energy 
products would penalize importing countries already penalized by the 
scarcity of resources in their own territories and would amount to a 
measure to protect the internal market that would be at odds with 
policies on cooperation with third countries. 
With regard to a possible tax on consumption, a number of specific points 
should be looked at. 
What types of consumption would be affected by this? (It goes without 
saying that all renewable energy sources would be promoted and therefore 
taken out of the tax regime.) This would act as a disincentive to using 
certain energy sources (oil, fossil fuels, etc.). Naturally, this is 
bound up with the debate on environmental acceptability; for this reason, 
a greater role should be found for this aspect as part of Community 
energy and environmental policies - a possible reduction in the use of 
fossil fuels, non-biodegradable plastic products, pesticides, 
fertilizers, etc. - rather than making it a source of funding for the 
Community budget, a resource which would of course be regressive and 
not, as should be the case, progressive. 
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The rapporteur therefore proposes, as a first step, that account should 
be taken of the fact that the Commission has set up a national experts' 
group to put forward suggestions forming an input to the Commission 
proposal to which Commission President Delors made reference when 
presenting the 1990 programme. It would therefore be interesting to 
contact the Commission departments res pons i bl e to inquire whether, in 
view of the overhaul of the own-resources system after 1992, it would be 
conceivable or, alternatively, untimely to put forward relevant ideas. 
At all events, it would be useful to have access to a study on 'ecotaxes' 
which set out both the environmental and budgetary implications thereof. 
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WORKING DOCUMENT 
on 
non-budgetized financial instruments 
Rapporteur: Mr Jean-Claude PASTY 
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1. The approaches now being considered by the Committee on Budgets to the 
future financing of the Community 1 ook ahead to the operation of the 
Single Market from 1993, and to the objectives of economic and monetary 
union and political union, in proposing financial reforms that would 
enable the Community to command sufficient financial resources to do 
justice to its objectives, and allow the two sides of the Budgetary 
Authority to enjoy an equitable distribution of financing powers. 
The reforms would also have to consolidate certain past and present 
financing practices to avoid perpetuating a number of existing 
conflicts. 
2. Among the problems that call out for political and technical solutions in 
the context of financial reform are borrowing and lending operations and 
the European Development Fund, which, together with the special case of 
the ECSC budget, constitute the major exceptions to the rule of budgetary 
uniformity that Parliament has always upheld. 
3. By virtue of that rule, a moral person in public law must draw up in a 
single document (the budget) all financial operations relating to the 
said moral person in the form of a statement of revenue and expenditure. 
Future financial reforms must incorporate that principle which, if 
adopted. wi 11 go a 1 ong way to meeting the cha 11 enge of the new 
requirements of Community policies, in particular by enabling the 
following to be secured in the longer term: 
-budgetization of borrowing and lending operations; 
-budgetization of the EDF; 
-integration of the ECSC operating budget into the genera 1 budget. 
the more necessary as the expiry date of the 50-year term for which the ECSC 
Treaty was initially concluded approaches. 
BUDGETIZATION OF BORROWING AND LENDING OPERATIONS 
a) Existing situation 
4. Borrowing and lending operations are not budgetized. This is a violation 
of Article 199 of the EEC Treaty, which stipulates: 
All items oF revenue and expenditure oF the Community[ ... ] shall be 
included in estimates to be drawn up For each Financial year and sha77 be 
shown in the budget. 
In 1990 revenue and expenditure relating to borrowing and lending 
amounted to 2,154.4m ECU, broken down as follows: 
NCI 927.2 
Euratom 393. 
Balances of payments 484.4 
Guarantee for EIB loans 
(Med. basin) 
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5. The Council is hiding behind 'technical' budgetary arguments to oppose the 
political moves by Parliament for budgetization, including for example 
such devices as non-allocation of revenue, the maximum rate, provisional 
twelfths and the classification of expenditure, arguments now weakened by 
the present approach by the Committee on Budgets to have the 1 atter 
distinction removed by the next budgetary procedure. 
6. The present approach to the budget i zat ion of borrowing and 1 ending is 
still at an embryonic stage, viz: 
- expenditure items are allocated a token entry as a Community guarantee 
in the event of default by an insolvent debtor (Articles 830, 831 and 
832 for balance of payments loans, Euratom and NCI); 
- expenditure items also provide for the financing of interest-rate 
rebates on certain loans; 
- revenue items are allocated a token entry giving entitlement to the 
proceeds of any proceedings taken against a defaulting debtor (Arts. 
801, 802 and 803); 
- an annex 1 isting borrowing and lending operations is provided every 
year, but is for information only, and is in no sense authoritative. 
Parliament 
procedure 
borrowing 
'Borrowing 
has for some years operated an amendment under the budgetary 
whereby a framework is provided for future budgetization of 
and lending by initiating a Part II of the budget entitled 
and lending operations'. 
b) Current trends 
7. The Commission, at the PDB stage of the 1990 budgetary procedure, 
reaffirmed its position in favour of budgetization, since it considers 
that an agreement in principle should be concluded between institutions 
in advance of the budgetary procedure on the form of presentation of 
borrowing and lending operations to be used in future. 
Since the Single Act the following should be noted: 
- on the one hand, the complementarity of budgetary operations and 
borrowing and lending operations; 
- on the other, the increasing recourse to these operations. 
This increasing recourse to borrowing and lending operations is also a 
feature· of the forthcoming incorporation 6f the territory of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), since Community financial operations during the 
interim period will be operated exclusively by means of Community loans. 
8. It therefore appears appropriate in terms of future financing to open 
negotiations on subsequent developments in this area, both in political 
terms and in the interests of strict budgetary orthodoxy. 
The growing importance of borrowing and 
increasingly unacceptable for Parliament 
supervision of these operations. 
lending 
to be 
operations 
excluded 
makes it 
from all 
Other points of contention such as the classification of expenditure as 
compulsory or non-compulsory, and possible implementation of the maximum 
rate, have lost much of their importance following the conclusion of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement and the drawing up of the financial 
perspectives. 
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The negotiations on a new agreement, possibly with new financial 
perspectives, which will be entered into in anticipation of future 
financing, should also look at the option of extending the overall volume 
of the new financial resources to include provision for borrowing and 
lending operations following their budgetization. 
9. In terms of future financing, the financial situation and the political 
conditions are considered as sufficiently favourable to enable Parliament 
to exercise supervision over authorization of these operations, whether: 
- after their budgetization, or 
- by obtaining power of legislative joint decision. 
10. Over and above supervision of the authorization of borrowing and lending 
operations as a whole, there arises, in the case of one of these 
instruments, namely loans under the single medium-term financial 
assistance facility, the more fundamental problem of its development in 
anticipation of economic and monetary union. 
Historically, before the establishment of the single medium-term financial 
assistance facility in 1988, two instruments were in existence: 
- the machinery for providing medium-term financial assistance, and 
- the Community loan mechanism. 
Regulation No 1969/88 of the Council of 24 June 1988 proceeded to merge 
these two instruments and to implement a single facility providing medium-
term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments. 
11. The spec i a 1 feature of this fac i 1 ity is that it is intended to serve a 
different purpose from the other borrowing and lending instruments, which 
are to be used to finance investment projects. 
Under the new facility the Community uses its credit to borrow on the 
international markets and to lend, on the same terms, the funds so 
obtained to Member States experiencing balance of payments difficulties, 
including Member States that are committed to implementing a programme of 
capital liberalization in spite of a sensitive balance of payments 
situation. 
Under the facility the Council had decided to grant certain loans to 
Italy, Ireland, France and Greece. 
The guarantee on these loans, 
provided for at present under 
guarantee for Community 1 oans 
which has simply been allocated 
on the basis of these instruments, is 
Art i c 1 e 830 of the genera 1 budget: 'EEC 
raised for ba 1 ance of payments support' , 
a token entry. 
12. This instrument was instituted in June 1988. At that time it was 
incorporated into: 
- on the one hand, the set of instruments relating to the new Community 
financial arrangements on own resources and budgetary discipline; 
- on the other, moves to secure financial integration of the Communities, 
the first stage of which was constituted by the programme to liberalize 
capital movements submitted by the Commission in 1986, and the second 
stage by: 
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a directive intended to secure complete l i bera 1 i zat ion of capital 
movements, 
the regulation establishing a single facility providing medium-term 
financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments 
The intention in 1988 was to advance by these successive stages to meet 
the challenge posed by the Single Act, namely achievement of the internal 
market and economic and social cohesiveness. 
It had by then become absolutely essential to implement reforms to the 
Community system of financing to adapt it to the operational needs of the 
single market. 
13. Economic and monetary union, which presupposes a much deeper and more 
complex stage of economic integration, will require a financing system on 
a Community scale capable of spearheading an active financial policy 
coordinated at both monetary and fiscal levels. 
In that connection, efforts to secure complete liberalization of capital 
movements wi 11 have to be speeded up if genuine liberalization is to be 
achieved by the intended deadlines. 
There will also be the problem in this connection of the future 
development of the single facility providing medium-term financial 
assistance for Member States' balances of payments, which will also have 
to be incorporated into the programme for comp 1 ete 1 i bera 1 i zat ion of 
capital movements, but the development of which, looking ahead to the 
objective of economic and monetary union and the more complete integration 
of the economies of the Member States, will take place in different 
conditions. 
The present system stipulates that before a 1 oan can be obtai ned the 
applicant Member State must adopt economic policy measures aimed at 
reestablishing a sustainable balance of payments situation adapted to the 
seriousness of the situation and the choice of policy. 
14. The deeper integration of economic policies will attenuate the specific 
impact of the economic pol icy measures having to be taken by the Member 
State concerned, just as it wi 11 limit the potentia 1 seriousness of the 
particular economic situation of that Member State. 
Consequently, far from calling into question an instrument that shares 
fully in economic and financial integration, it would certainly be more 
appropriate to review the practical details of implementation in 
anticipation of economic and monetary union and the resultant 
approximation of national policies. 
DOC_EN\RR\98958 - 28- PE 144.172/f'in./C 
BUDGETIZATION OF THE EDF 
a) Present situation 
15. Budgetization of appropriations earmarked for financial cooperation with 
third countries in their entirety, and in particular in that connection, 
budgetization of the EDF, is a long-standing claim of Parliament's. 
Without repeating all the arguments put forward by the European Parliament 
at every stage in its efforts to secure EDF budgetization, the following 
points can be made in justification of the demand: 
The purpose of such budgetization 
Community's declared resolve to 
international cooperation, and to 
Community policies; 
is to give concrete form to the 
implement a genuine policy of 
integrate that policy with other 
- Budget i zat ion will on the one hand enable the European Parliament to 
ensure democratic parliamentary monitoring of appropriations that at 
present lie outside its powers of control - a situation it wishes to see 
discontinued in its search for new powers to make up the existing 
democratic deficit - and on the other, in the interests of budgetary 
orthodoxy, budgetization of these operations will be a major 
contribution to completing the principle of budgetary uniformity on the 
same basis as the budgetization of borrowing and lending operations. 
16. As matters now stand, EDF revenue is drawn from national contributions 
paid on the basis of a separate allocation scheme. These are funds paid 
by the Member States independently of the budget. 
In terms of expenditure, a 'standby structure' for budgetization already 
exists in Chapters 90 and 91, since the remarks column stipulates that: 
'Chapters 90 and 91 are intended to accommodate the EOF Funds once the 
European Development Fund is included in the budget.' 
Each year Parliament, in the context of the budget procedure, tables an 
amendment calling for improvements in the information provided on the 
implementation of the EDF by summarising its data in the remarks column in 
Chapters 90 and 91 and inc 1 ud i ng provision a 1 figures for the 
implementation of the budget as featured in an annex to the draft budget 
entitled 'Financial Information on the European Development Fund'. 
It should also be pointed out that Parliament grants discharge to the 
Commission on the implementation of EDF appropriations. 
b) Current trends 
17. Recent developments in Eastern Europe oblige the Community to review its 
overall strategy for cooperation policy with third countries, and to draw 
up a new policy in this area. 
This operation will have to be incorporated into a wider approach aimed at 
reducing the i mba 1 ances that are appearing as a result of events in 
Eastern Europe between the different operations existing at present, 
while providing the financial resources necessary to react positively to 
the strengthen; ng of existing operations and meet the new cha 11 enges of 
cooperation policy. 
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The Community must effectively implement a genuine international 
cooperation policy with its new guidelines, integrate that policy with 
other Community policies, and endow it with the necessary budgetary 
resources. 
Strengthened communitization of the Community's international cooperation 
policy inevitably presupposes budgetization of the EDF. 
18. Economic and political data appear favourable to proceeding in that 
direction. Approaches to the future reform of the Community's finances 
converge in acknowledging that the Community must have at its disposal own 
resources (drawn where necessary from new Community taxes) sufficient to 
enable it to take up its new duties and assignments in anticipation of 
economic and monetary union and political union. 
Such financial arguments as the lack of resources specifically referred to 
by the Commission (negotiations on the Delors package) or the problems of 
contribution scales, once prominently highlighted for the purpose of 
resisting EDF budgetization, now belong to past history. 
19. Moreover, there is no reason why the financial and budgetary impact of 
this transfer of financing of operations to Community level, which is 
capable of ensuring increased efficiency, should result in an increase in 
the overall fiscal burden on the European taxpayer, since any increase in 
Community resources by one means or another will be matched by equivalent 
relief at national level. 
Consequently, there is a strong case, backed by the requirements of 
budgetary orthodoxy and adherence to the principle of budgetary 
uniformity, for proceeding with budget i zat ion of the EDF on the side of 
both revenue and expenditure. 
Consideration might well be given to laying down certain principles in 
this connection, such as deadlines for implementation, the form of 
budgetization of appropriations (revenue, expenditure), amendments to the 
Financial Regulation, incorporation of the EDF into the financial 
perspectives, etc. 
BUDGETIZATION OF THE ECSC 
a) Present situation 
20. The historical and budgetary development of the Community has led to the 
emergence of two budgets, the genera 1 budget of the EC and the ECSC 
operating budget, which has special features of its own such that the 
European Parliament has never considered it as a real budgetary 
instrument, let alone a real budget. 
This operating budget, which is subject to a special budgetary procedure 
and answers to its own budgetary rules, is subject to Parliament's 
'assent'. 
21. Parliament has always sought in the opinions it has submitted to the 
Commission and/or the High Authority to persuade the latter to convert 
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this operating budget into a genuine budget with, for example, greater 
transparency, a distinction between commitment and payment appropriations, 
or to act on any other suggestions intended to consolidate or complete 
budgetization of all financial operations and bring the operating budget 
more into line with conventional budgetary practice. 
The purpose of this campaign is eventua 11 y to secure genuine 
'parallelism' between the two budgets, leading ultimately to their 
consolidation or integration into the Community budget. 
22. For some years certain new features have been appearing, 
increasing de facto approximation between these two 
facilitating their integration in the longer term. 
creating an 
budgets and 
In some cases, for example, direct or indirect contributions from the EEC 
budget to the ECSC budget now take the form of reductions in the ECSC 
administrative contribution to the EE<: budget, or of direct financial 
transfers from the general budget to the ECSC budget. 
Another illustration of the progressive integration of the two budgets 
results from the June 1988 decision on own resources, whereby customs 
duties on products of the iron and steel and coal industries are now 
treated as own resources entered in the EEC budget. 
Lastly, certain EEC financial operations, in particular those channelled 
through the structural funds, now take the form of substantial payments 
to assist ECSC sectors in difficulty. 
23. This dual development, encompassing: 
- on the one hand, all the operations undertaken at procedural level by 
Parliament to align the separate procedure and special features of the 
E<:SC budget as far as possible with the general budget, and 
- on the other, the interpenetration between the two budgets in recent 
years, 
is only a first step towards securing the political objective pursued by 
Parliament, which has repeatedly indicated that it hoped to see the ECSC 
operating budget being completely integrated into the general budget. 
b) Current trends 
24. The objective of ECSC budgetization must consequently be considered in 
this connection as a determination to see the two budgets combined. 
Approaches to future financing must integrate both these aspects as they 
apply to the ECSC operating budget, but with a greater determination to 
ensure that ECSC activities as a whole are brought within the ambit of 
the general budget. 
ECSC financial activities must moreover be understood to include that 
Institution's borrowing and lending operations, which have been expanding 
steadily. 
25. This strategy of consolidating the two budgets, like the budgetization of 
the EDF and of borrowing and lending operations, is in line with 
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26. 
Parliament's resolve to exercise political and democratic monitoring of 
Community finances as a whole. 
It can and must, in particular in the present more favourable economic 
circumstances, be carried through with the maximum rapidity, with special 
consideration being given to the much more sensitive - but no longer far-
distant - problem of the future of the ECSC, the Treaty estab 1 ish i ng 
which will expire in 2002. 
Integration of the ECSC budget 
for a solution adjusted to the 
progressively integrating its 
policies. 
into that of the EEC must clear the way 
future of the ECSC and to the problem of 
operations into the corresponding EEC 
Parliament should consequently make a point of insisting that the 
institutions concerned (Council, Commission, Parliament) must begin 
immediately to give due consideration to the future of the ECSC as of the 
deadline laid down by the Treaties, and to the manner in which ECSC 
operations and responsibilities are to be taken over. 
CONCLUSIONS 
27. In the rapporteur's view, the future financial reform of the Community 
must be such as to provide it with the resources necessary to achieve its 
new objectives and new policies, as drawn up in anticipation of economic 
and monetary union and of political union. 
It must also be accompanied at institutional level by the necessary 
changes in the balance of financial powers between Parliament and the 
Council. 
28. The rapporteur therefore asks for Parliament to be enabled in this 
connection to acquire real powers of democratic control over Community 
finances as a whole and not, as is the case at p~esent, over only a part 
of them. 
Consequently in terms of the budget, apart frem the extension of its 
powers to cover all expenditure in the genera1 budget as it now stands, 
Parliament must exercise democratic control over all other financial 
operations relating to the Community. 
29. To that end, in the rapporteur's view, the only possible frame of 
reference and basis for these financial operations as a whole, must, in 
the interests of rationalisation, clarification and effectiveness of 
monitoring, be the budget of the Community, which, in addition to 
existing operations, must include borrowing and lending operations, the 
EDF and the items of revenue and expenditure of the ECSC operating budget. 
30. The rapporteur therefore proposes: 
a) Having regard to budgetization of borrowing and lending operations, 
an annual budget entry for these items, which must be made subject to 
the same budgetary procedure (present or future) as is applicable to 
all Community resources and expenditure. The Community must 
rationalize and improve its borrowing and lending policy authorised 
and monitored by the Budgetary Authority. 
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Budget i zat ion must be such as to enable the Budgetary Authority to 
fix the maximum annua 1 overa 11 budget of capita 1 operations on the 
basis of comp 1 ete information re 1 at i ng to the debt situation of the 
Community. In that connection the creation of a 'capital budget' of 
the Communities would assist in formulating a clear overall approach 
to the Community's borrowing and lending policy. 
There arises more specifically in the context of borrowing and lending 
operations as a who 1 e the prob 1 em of 1 oans under the single med i urn-
term financial assistance facility, and in particular of the 
development of that facility in the light of progressively deepening 
economic integration in the lead-up to economic and monetary union. 
b) Budgetization of the EDF, which must give concrete expression to the 
resolve of the Community to implement a genuine pol icy on 
international cooperation on the basis of an acceptable political 
balance between the different financial operations, not only for 
Eastern Europe but also for the ACP countries, Latin America and Asia, 
the Mediterranean countries, etc. A genuine policy of consistent 
development necessarily presupposes budgetization of all relevant 
financial operations and not, as at present, only some of them. 
c) Integration, on the basis of financial reforms anticipating future 
financing arrangements, of the ECSC operating budget into the general 
budget of the European Communities. That integration must apply not 
on 1 y to the current revenue and expenditure of the ECSC operating 
budget, but, in the interests of consistency with the reso 1 ve to 
budgetize Community borrowing and lending operations as a whole, also 
to the different borrowing and lending operations peculiar to the 
ECSC. 
Looking beyond this immediate objective, which must be incorporated into the 
overall guidelines for future financing that result from it, the rapporteur 
hopes that studies will be 1 aunched with immediate effect, and with the 
active participation of the European Parliament, into the choice of options 
for future Community pol icy in the coal and steal sectors after 2002, the 
year in which the ECSC Treaty expires, together with the budgetary 
consequences resulting from them. 
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1. The high degree of integration of the Community into the international 
system is primarily the result of historical factors originating in the 
extern a 1 re 1 at ions of the Member States, but is a 1 so due to the va 1 ue 
added created by the Community itself in the context of the completion of 
an internal market defined by its own customs frontier. 
2. The Community, as a regional subsystem, is under permanent pressure from 
the international system and its tensions. As its history shows, its 
development is not compatible with isolationist policies, in view of its 
substantial dependence on international trade both for raw material 
supplies and for markets for its products. 
The Community's status as a major trade power makes it a pole of 
attraction for third countries, but also points to the need for it to put 
its potential at the service of the correct administration of 
international relations in the field of trade and finance. 
3. Over the period 1987-1989, the total value of the Community's exports 
amounted to 1115.4 m ECU, as opposed to 820.1 m for the US and 674.2 m for 
Japan. The total value of the Community's imports over the same period 
was 1176.1 m ECU; the corresponding figures for the US and Japan were 
1154.5 m and 479.3 m respectively. 
It is clear from these figures that the Community's high degree of 
integration into the international system should not be viewed exclusively 
from the economic viewpoint; it should, rather, be considered as a basis 
for obtaining mutually-advantageous conditions for both the Community and 
its partners and developing the necessary level of solidarity with third 
countries. 
4. However, a number of other factors must be borne in mind: the 1 ong 
periods of worldwide economic depression with their disastrous 
implications for certain regions of the world, the development gap between 
regions, the Third World debt, the fact that neither the US nor Japan 
alone is in a position to be the motor of growth or the regulator of the 
world economy, and, most recently, the unprecedented wave of changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe. All these factors are conclusive evidence of 
the need for a redefinition of the groundrules of international relations, 
and, in addition, point to the importance at Community level of re-
examining the whole basis of external policy. 
5. The Community's relations with third countries are based on the powers 
conferred on it by the Treaties. The exercise of these powers implies the 
definition of a policy whose implementation is confirmed by various types 
of intervention. 
Such a policy is directly linked to the institutional process, especially 
in view of the diverse and disparate forms of intervention existing. 
It is therefore essential that the resources placed at the disposal of 
such a policy should be sufficient to ensure consistency in the 
Community's dealings with third countries, while at the same time 
contributing to the development of synergies between the Community 
i nst itut ions. 
DOC_EN\RR\98958 - 35 - PE 144.172/fin. /C 
6. The new context arising with the prospect of comp 1 et ion of the 1 arge 
internal market makes it essential to determine clearly the nature of 
those resources; they should be utilised in such a way as to avoid 
temporary remedies or situations of institutional paralysis, both of which 
would, in the long term, inevitably undermine the Community's dynamic as 
regards relations with third countries. 
7. Article 210 of the EEC Treaty endows the Community with legal personality, 
thus enabling it to cooperate with third countries on the basis of a 
framework of sectorial provisions which are also set out in the Treaty. 
This applies to economic and financial cooperation agreements, association 
agreements, conventions reinforcing economic and soci a 1 activities and 
instituting international groupings, accessions to international 
agreements concerning basic products and policies whose development 
involves external considerations and requires international cooperation. 
8. These forms of cooperation obviously have financial implications, but not 
all of them are identified in the Community budget, despite the provisions 
of Article 199 of the Treaty and the principle of budgetary unity which 
Parliament has always defended. 
9. The realization of such Community policies as the customs union or the 
common agricultural policy, with their respective external effects, has 
led the Community to examine their impact jointly with its partners and to 
adopt a system of progressive reductions. 
The implementation of the customs union, together with the creation of the 
common customs tariff, whose economic function is to regulate trade with 
the rest of the world; the complementary regulatory instruments such as 
the anti-dumping and compensatory duties; the quantitative restrictions; 
the agricultural levies; and the levies on ECSC products: all these 
measures have financial implications for budget revenue, as well as 
constituting the framework within which cooperation pol icy with third 
countries is conducted. 
10. In these circumstances, the question of budgetary authority arises; it has 
to be asked how much influence this factor has on the above-mentioned 
financial implications, especially at a time when a clear philosophy 
exists concerning the correct role and functions of the Community budget. 
11. In the Community budget system, it is the Member States who determine the 
resources to be allocated to the Community, on the basis of the 
intergovernmental conference followed by ratification by the national 
parliaments. Nevertheless, the Treaty has from the beginning also 
allotted own resources to the Community, as in the case of duties under 
the common customs tariff and the agricultural levies. 
12. The 1 eve 1 of these two sources of revenue is, however, decided by the 
Council. The agricultural levies are fixed by the Council of Agriculture 
Ministers, and are viewed 1 ess as resources than as a market regulation 
mechanism. 
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13. It must be asked whether this practice should be considered satisfactory 
and whether it leads to correct determination and efficient management of 
the budget. It may be argued, on the contrary, that it permits situations 
in which financial resources evade the indispensable control, in the 
fields of assessment and administration, of the two branches of budgetary 
authority; the result is a distortion of the process of legitimation of 
the financial effects of the various policies and a denial of the powers 
of democratic control of the budgetary authority. 
14. This situation is further affected by the question of the management of 
these resources in the context of the nation a 1 budgets of the Member 
States. The existing structural disparities create a situation in which 
an influx of goods from third countries can have a widely varying impact 
on the finances of the different Member States. 
15. With regard to the quantitative aspects of these resources, one should 
bear in mind their decreasing importance in the medium and long term. In 
particular, the agricultural levies, linked as they are to world price 
fluctuations and exchange rate variations, form a highly unstable own 
resource. In the case of customs duties, it should be stressed that their 
determination is conditioned by the GATT agreements, which involve a 
reduction in levels of duty. 
The Community wishes to consider the financial implications of its customs 
duties in the context of its policy of cooperation with third countries on 
the basis of clauses concerning the conditions of trade. These clauses 
are negotiated within the framework of association agreements, whether of 
the customs union type or the free trade zone type (as in the case of 
EFTA), trade agreements or the generalized tariff preferences scheme. In 
general, all the clauses in question provide for a reduction; this makes 
it clear that the tendency for budget revenue to decrease is a fact which 
must be faced. Parliament has on several occasions called on the 
Commission to supply an estimate of the evolution of these sources of 
revenue - which clearly constitute forms of taxation - in relation to 
Community expenditure, in accordance with Article 199 of the Treaty. 
16. The impact of cooperation on the level of budgetary expenditure in the 
Community also requires analysis. 
Over the 1980s as a whole, the share of the Community budget devoted to 
cooperation with third countries was constantly reduced, in relative 
terms; it fell from 5.7% in 1980 to 4.3% in 1986 and 2.7% in 1989. This 
tendency does not apply equally to all regions: cooperation levels have 
been roughly stable as regards third countries in the Mediterranean 
region, Latin America and Asia, whereas there has been a steep fall in the 
case of the African LDCs. Nevertheless, there is a danger of a new 
imbalance arising in the Community's relations with third countries. The 
problem could be worsened by action in favour of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, given the rapid evolution taking place in that region. 
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17. In addition, the question of the budgetary powers of the two branches of 
budgetary authority is affecting policy-making in areas for which no 
alternative solutions exist. This is the case in the fields of food aid 
and the classification of expenditure. Consideration should be given to 
the possibility of introducing rules aimed at more effective policy 
promotion. In the case of cooperation with Latin American and Asian 
countries, management of the appropriations is complicated by the climate 
of uncertainty created by the lack of a policy for defining objectives; 
this in turn makes it difficult to estimate the appropriations required on 
a multiannual basis. 
18. It may also be asked whether, in fact, the information available to the 
Community institutions is sufficient for the definition of a policy which 
would correspond to the needs of each of the above regions. 
In view of the marked reduction in the appropriations for these regions, 
Parliament has already stressed the need to initiate a new policy. It is 
equally essential that the Commission should, on the basis of the 
understanding that it has itself recently achieved on the matter, propose 
criteria for the intelligent utilization of the Community's financial 
resources, so as to enable the budgetary authority to undertake assessment 
and planning of the expenditure concerned. 
19. At present, the budgetary expression of the concept of cooperation with 
third countries is largely dependent on geographical distinctions. One 
side-effect of cooperation is an enhanced awareness of the severe problems 
affecting the countries concerned, which are also likely to have 
consequences for the Community. The problem of the tropical forests and 
their future and the drug question both also affect Europe. The need for 
effective action on these problems obviously entails the adoption of 
concrete measures with a view to obtaining a more accurate assessment of 
the impact of Community expenditure. 
20. Within a more restricted geographical area, the Community is tending to 
base its cooperation with third countries on programmes and actions which 
were originally intended for the Member States. This is the case with the 
COMETT and ERASMUS programmes; there may be similar extensions of 
programmes in the field of research and development. 
The proliferation of this type of cooperation arrangement points to the 
need for an assessment of its likely value to both parties and for a more 
general evaluation of the promotion of policies which are considered of 
potential interest to third countries. In these circumstances, it is 
important both to examine the conditions of participation of third 
countries in each of the initiatives concerned and to estimate the level 
of funding required. 
21. At present, these programmes are identified in the budget by the inclusion 
of a structure for participation in the revenue section. Within the 
framework of a cooperation agreement with the EEC, the third country 
concerned deposits a contribution in order to join the programme in 
question. This contribution takes into account, among other factors, the 
country's economic situation. In the case of possible cooperation with 
third countries on a sectorial basis, the underlying question is whether 
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third countries are interested in and capable of participating in the 
various programmes. The state of their economies varies, and in some 
cases, where a country is interested but cannot fulfil both the above 
conditions, provision must be made for its participation on a sectorial 
basis by means of an allocation in the Community budget. 
In these circumstances, it would clearly be desirable to ensure the 
release of the necessary funds for each of the initiatives concerned. 
22. The recent experience in relation to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe demonstrates that cooperation with these countries is following the 
same lines as those which have characterized cooperation with the 
Mediterranean Basin countries, the only difference being that it is being 
accompanied by the creation of the BERD. It is based, nevertheless, on 
the principle of developing links with third countries through a series of 
actions or policies. However, the participation of third countries in 
various initiatives opens up the possibility of enhanced sectorial 
cooperation; this would require the determination of political priorities, 
but would also enable third countries to affirm their own priorities 
through participation in diverse initiatives. 
Conclusions 
1. The high degree of integration of the Community into the international 
system, the non-viability of isolationist policies; the growing importance 
of the EEC at world level and the fact that neither the US nor Japan alone 
can be the motor and regulator of growth and world economic activity; the 
inequalities of development existing in the world and the severe problems 
confronting Third World countries, especially those created by the 
external debt and the deterioration of the terms of trade; and, finally, 
the rapid changes taking place in certain regions, especially Central and 
Eastern Europe: a 11 these and other factors point to the need for a 
redefinition of the groundrules of international relations, in which the 
Community should participate on a fuller, more consistent and more 
effective basis. In this context, it is also vital to undertake a 
comprehensive examination of the Community's entire external policy- not 
solely in the economic context, but also with a view to obtaining mutual 
advantages and developing the necessary solidarity. 
2. The powers conferred on the Community by the Treaties in respect of 
relations with third countries, and the resources placed at its disposal 
for the development of those relations should, taken together, provide a 
sufficient basis for a coherent policy towards third countries. An 
essential precondition here is the constant creation of synergies between 
the Community institutions. 
The correct identification of the resources concerned must be ensured from 
the outset, especially in view of the impending completion of the internal 
market by 1993. It is equally vital that these resources should be 
utilized in such a way as to avoid temporary remedies or situations of 
institutional paralysis, both of which would undermine the goal of 
consistent relations between the Community and third countries. 
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3. It is also essential that the financial effects of cooperation - without 
exception, and irrespective of the specific forms taken by cooperation -
should be identifiable in the Community budget, in accordance with Article 
199 of the Treaty and with the principle of budgetary unity which 
Parliament has traditionally defended. These are among the necessary 
preconditions for the 'budget i zat ion' of the EDF, which is another of 
Parliament's long-standing demands. 
The budgetary authority should meanwhile take full responsibility for 
dealing with the financial implications of Community policies. 
4. Article 210 of the EEC Treaty endows the Community with legal personality, 
while the Treaties give it the right to its own resources. 
The fact that the Community's own financial resources are determined and 
administered by only one branch of the budgetary authority - thus at times 
reducing those resources to the role of mere market regulation mechanisms 
- means that the necessary correct assessment and efficient management of 
the budget are lacking. It also leads to a situation of inadequate 
monitoring and distorts the process of legitimation of the financial 
effects. 
5. At the same time, in view of the likely tendency for the own resources to 
be reduced due to the probable fall in certain sources of revenue, there 
is an urgent need to undertake a detailed forecast of their future 
evolution, the consequences for expenditure and, in particular, the 
possible implications for cooperation spending. 
6. With regard to the cooperation expenditure included in the budget, the 
reduction in their relative weight over the 1980s and the different 
treatment given to the various regions have created the danger, should 
current trends continue, of a new imbalance arising in the Community's 
relations with third countries. This could be worsened by action in 
favour of the countries of Centra 1 and Eastern Europe, in view of the 
speed of developments in the region and the particular attention being 
paid to it. In view of these tendencies, and of the completion of the 
internal market {whose impact on the economies of the LDCs will have to be 
carefully analyzed), consideration must be given to increasing expenditure 
on cooperation with the various regions of the world. 
In this context, it is a 1 so important to examine the recent Commission 
proposals concerning Latin America and Asia (for the period 1991-1995) and 
Mediterranean third countries {for the period 1992-1996). 
7. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of a more efficient 
implementation of the rules for the promotion of certain policies, such as 
food aid. Thus, in the case of cooperation with Latin America and Asia, 
it is essential to remedy the unstable situation with regard to the 
management of the appropriations, by means of a policy for the definition 
of objectives without which it is also difficult to estimate the 
appropriations required on a multiannual basis. 
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8. The Community institutions do not possess the necessary information for 
the definition of a po 1 icy sui ted to the i nd i vi dua 1 needs of the above 
regions. It is therefore essential that the Commission should propose 
criteria for the correct utilization of Community resources, so as to 
enable the budgetary authority to carry out the necessary assessment and 
planning of the expenditure concerned. Measures must also be adopted to 
improve the assessment of the impact of the Community's own expenditure. 
9. While there is no intention in the present context of abolishing or even 
reforming the genera 1 di st i net ion between compulsory and non-compulsory 
expenditure, it should be noted that approximately 75% of the expenditure 
related to cooperation with third countries is classified as non-
compulsory expenditure. This raises the question of the reasonableness 
of classifying the remainder as compulsory expenditure. 
10. Cooperation with certain countries is based primarily on the extension to 
the third countries concerned of actions and programmes which were 
originally intended for the Member States. It is essential to consider 
the possibility of extending the field of cooperation with the countries 
concerned and to determine the possible forms of their participation in 
the new programmes (including the possibility of financial participation) 
and the availability of funds. Such a policy, implying greater sectorial 
cooperation, would obviously require the political priorities to be 
defined by the Community, but it would simultaneously permit the third 
countries concerned to affirm their own priorities and options. 
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